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Abstract

This paper investigates a new explanation for the international equity home bias puzzle based on
an endogenous asymmetric information model. Using a cross-sectional mutual fund data set, it is
found that the degrees of home bias across fund managers are negatively correlated to the asset
sizes under their management. This result is consistent with the theoretical prediction in the
endogenous asymmetric information model--the portfolio managers with the larger assets tend to
acquire more information regarding foreign equity and, hence, hold more foreign equity
holdings.
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1. Introduction
Equity home bias, the observation that individuals hold too little of their fund size in
foreign assets, is one of the major puzzles in international finance. The standard capital asset
pricing model suggests that investors should diversify their fund size across countries, yet the
observed data indicate that investors seem to largely forgo this gain to diversification. Previous
literatures have demonstrated theoretically the sizeable advantage of international diversification
(Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Solnik, 1974). In particular, simulations in Lewis (1999) predict that
American investors’ portfolios should have at least 40 percent in foreign assets. However, the
actual proportion of foreign assets held by American investors is only about 10 percent (French
and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar and Werner, 1995; Ahearne, Griever and
Warnock, 2004).
In an effort to understand how asymmetric information leads to international equity home
bias, Gehrig (1993) and Brennan and Cao (1997) show that the investors will have more home
equity holdings if the investors are assumed to have a static information advantage over foreign
investors about domestic markets. 1 Kang and Stulz (1997) present some indirect evidence that
foreign investors primarily invest in stocks of Japanese companies that are more familiar to
them, even when the expected returns are lower than the returns on other Japanese stocks. Portes,
Rey and Oh (2001) use the volume of telephone calls as a proxy for information costs and finds
positive contribution to the gross flow of equity transactions. The countries with a greater share
of firms that have public U.S. listings (which mitigates information costs) tend to be less
severely underweighted in U.S. equity portfolios (Ahearne et al., 2004; Edison and Warnock,
2004; Aggarwal, Klapper and Wysocki, 2005, for US mutual funds; Chan, Covrig and Ng, 2005,
for 26 countries). 2 Ferreira and Miguel (2007) use industry concentration as a proxy for
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information and find a positive correlation between industry concentration and the domestic and
foreign equity biases. Lütje and Menkhoff (2007) use mutual fund survey data from a German
questionnaire and find that informational and behavioral determinants of home bias hold
simultaneously.3 These papers establish the important role that asymmetric information can play
in explaining the home bias puzzle.
Different from earlier theoretical work on home bias, Barron and Ni (2006) present a homebias model that relies on asymmetric information and explain differences in the extent of home
bias across portfolio managers.

Their rational expectation model includes an information

acquisition process in which heterogeneous domestic portfolio managers (in terms of portfolio
size) decide whether to acquire costly information on foreign assets. The analysis adds to
Gehrig's (1993) finding that informed portfolio managers have higher demands for foreign assets
by linking the acquisition of information by portfolio managers in each country directly to their
portfolio size.

The simulations based on the model illustrate the effect of asymmetric

information on the home bias. First, the simulation shows that portfolio managers with larger
initial assets will have a higher proportion of assets in foreign securities (less equity home bias).
Second, fewer portfolio managers are informed when the information cost increases, and thus the
home bias is more pronounced. This provides explanation to size effects on home bias found in
recent research (Karlsson and Norden, 2007; Graham, Harvey and Huang, 2005).4
The objective of this paper is to shed additional light on the role of asymmetric
information on equity home bias based on Barron and Ni’s model. Following Barron and Ni
(2006), we focus on the institutional investors who have relatively more information (Bushee and
Goodman, 2007; Lütje and Menkhoef, 2007) and investigate the different degrees of home bias
across them. Using cross-sectional mutual fund data, we indicate that the home bias exists even
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for this relatively informed group. However, the degree of the home bias is less than the
observed national aggregate level. Most importantly, the regression results show that foreign
asset holdings are positively and significantly associated with the portfolio sizes of the managers,
which is consistent with the theoretical model. This conclusion is robust among the subgroups
(whole sample, single manager group, domestic equity fund group, and domestic equity funds
with a single manager) after controlling the other variables such as fund concentration, manager
tenures, total number of holdings, fund categories and objectives, number of funds, expense
ratios, dummies for team management and dummies for close-ended funds.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly introduces the endogenous
asymmetric information theory and sets up the hypothesis. Section 3 discusses the data source
and regression analysis. Conclusions follow in the final section.

2. The Theory and Hypothesis
Following Barron and Ni (2006), we assume two symmetric markets: the home market A
and the foreign market B. Each market has a large number of portfolio managers (including fund
managers and individual investors) so that each investor has an infinitesimal effect on the
market. The portfolio managers are uniformly distributed over the range [0, 1] according to the
levels of their initial portfolio size W0 , i.e. f (W0 ) = 1, W0 [0,1]
To each portfolio manager, there are three available assets in the market: a risky asset
with return RA issued by the home market, a risky asset with return RB issued by the foreign
market, and a risk-free asset with return r:
Rj =  j +  j ,

j = A, B

(1)
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where the random variable  j has a normal distribution with mean  j and variance  j ,

the

error term  j is an i.i.d. variable and has normal distribution with mean 0 and variance  2j , and
jointly,  j

and  j

have a multivariate normal distribution with

E ( j  j ) = 0

and

Var ( R j |  j ) =  2j .  j is observable to all portfolio managers in their own country j at no cost,
and is observable to the informed portfolio managers in the other country at a cost of c . To keep
things concise, we also assume that the observed returns of the risky assets are uncorrelated.
Each portfolio manager makes two sequential decisions: strategic information acquisition
and investment. All portfolio managers are assumed to have information about the home market
at zero cost. On the other hand, they need to decide whether to acquire information by paying a
cost c or to remain uninformed about the foreign market. In order to focus on the information
acquisition decision, we further assume in the model that there are no barriers to investment
other than the cost of information, no currency and political risk, no deviations from purchasing
power parity, and no interest rate differentials on average.
The decision to acquire information on foreign assets is based on a comparison of the
expected utility when informed and the expected utility when uninformed. The maximization of
expected utility for portfolio managers in each country is now characterized in detail. Bagnoli
and Watts (2000) indicate that for funds that had more than 50% of their assets invested in stocks
in 1995, a majority set the future compensation of their managers equal to a constant percentage
of the future value of the managed assets.5 It is assumed that as the initial portfolio size W o
increases, the proportion of the future value of the portfolio that is paid as compensation to one
of the managers of the fund decreases. That is, let t denote the proportion of the fund's future
value paid as compensation to one of its fund managers, it is assumed that t '(W o ) < 0 .
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A simple expression can be obtained for the proportion of the fund's future value paid as
compensation to each manager as follows. Assuming that there are constant returns to scale in
portfolio management, then the ratio of the total number of portfolio managers to total initial
portfolio size, denoted by n, is a positive constant, and the total number of portfolio managers at
a fund with initial portfolio size W o equals nW o . Further, assume the total future compensation
across all managers of a fund is a constant proportion v of the total future value of the fund.
Then, the future compensation to one of these fund managers, tW 1kj , equals (v / (nW 0 ) )W 1kj ,
such that t '(W o ) < 0 .
Assuming an exponential utility function for compensation, a representative portfolio
manager (one of nWo managers) of type k ( k = I , U ) with initial total asset value W o in
country j ( j = A, B ) anticipates utility V (W1kj ) in the form:

V (W1kj ) = − exp(−aW1kj )

(2)

where a = a ' v / (nW 0 ) and a ' is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion of a portfolio
manager, which is assumed to be the same across portfolio managers. Without loss of generality,
Barron and Ni (2006) show that the units of portfolio size are set such that a ' v / n = 1 and thus

a = 1/ W o .6
It is further assumed that portfolio managers have access to a risk-free asset available in
limitless supply. Then portfolio manager of type k who lives in country l will have a future
fund size equal to W1kl = (W0 −  c)r + X Akl ( RA − rPA ) + X Bkl ( RB − rPB ) , where X klj is the demand
for country j ’s ( j = A, B ) risky asset by individual of type k ( k = I , U ) who lives in country l
( l = A, B ).  is a function that equals 0 if the portfolio manager is uninformed ( k = U ) and 1 if
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the portfolio manager is informed ( k = I ), Pj is the price of country j ’s risky asset, and c is the
total information cost. Note that the price of the risk-free asset is normalized to 1.
The information acquisition decision leads to two types of portfolio managers in each
market: the informed portfolio managers (I) with information on their home and foreign markets,
and the uninformed portfolio managers (U) with home market information only. Barron and Ni
(2006) proved that there exists a cutoff portfolio size level, W , such that portfolio managers with
larger initial asset size than the cutoff asset size become informed, and the portfolio managers
with less initial asset size than the cutoff asset size remain uninformed. Given the distribution of
portfolio managers f (W0 ) , note that a higher cutoff W implies that the proportion of informed
portfolio managers is lower.
Both informed and uninformed portfolio managers make decisions about the demand for
assets. In particular, the maximization of expected utility yields the following demands by
informed portfolio managers ( k = I ) in either country:
X AIl =

 A − rPA

a A2

X BIl =

 B − rPB
1
 l = A, B; a =
.
2
a B
W0

(3)

Similarly, the demands for uninformed portfolio managers (k=U) in country A are

X

UA
A

 − rP
= A 2 A
a A

X

UA
B

E ( RB | PB = PB ) − rPB
=

a Var ( RB | PB = PB )

a=

1
.
W0

(4)

and for uninformed portfolio managers in country B, the demand functions for the two assets are

X UB
A =

E ( RA | PA = PA ) − rPA

aVar ( RA | PA = PA )

X BUB =

 B − rPB
1
 a=
2
W0
a B

(5)

where E ( R j | Pj ) denotes the expected return on asset j for an uninformed portfolio manager
living in country l  j based on the observed price.
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The demand of informed portfolio managers depends on the revealed information on
asset returns and the asset prices. The demand of uninformed portfolio managers depends on the
asset prices only. The larger the portfolios are, the larger are the risky asset investment. For the
case where the portfolio is determined by a set of managers, the above demands represent the
consensus among these managers with respect to the optimal fund portfolio.7 This consensus has
a scaling property that the managers' view of the optimal proportion of the fund's portfolio
allocated to risky-assets (domestic and foreign) is invariant to portfolio size. However, each fund
manager's loss in compensation from the acquisition of information on foreign assets is less
because information costs are shared across a number of fund managers. The resulting lower
average information cost per fund manager (economies of scale) means that the management
teams are more likely to acquire the costly information on foreign assets (become informed).
Under the assumption of rational expectation, prices have a certain relationship with the
underlying asset return and supply, such that at equilibrium the prices clear the international
capital market by equating total asset supply to total asset demand.



W



W

0

1

1

W

1

1

1

W

1

IA
UB
IB
X UA
A f (W0 ) dW0 + W X A f (W0 ) dW0 + W X A f (W0 ) dW0 + 0 X A f (W0 ) dW0 = 2 0 x A f (W0 )dW0 ;

i.e.:
0

X BUA f (W0 )dW0 +  X BIA f (W0 )dW0 +  X BIB f (W0 )dW0 +  X BUB f (W0 )dW0 = 2 xB f (W0 )dW0 ;
W
W
0
0

where x A and xB are per capita supply of the risky asset A and B with mean xA , xB and
variance  A ,  B , respectively. Note the density function f (W0 ) = 1,  W0  [0,1] .
With the above setup, it is shown that, holding other things constant, the gain to
becoming informed is an increasing function of the initial asset size and a decreasing function of
the cost of information.8 Given the uniform distribution of the portfolio managers in terms of
portfolio size, this result means that information cost ratios are monotonically decreasing over
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the range [0, 1]. There exists a cutoff information ratio, c W , such that each portfolio manager
purchases information if and only if c W0  c W .
Hypothesis 1: The fund managers with larger portfolios will be more likely to become
informed.
Hypothesis 1 predicts that those managers with larger assets will acquire information
concerning foreign assets; those portfolio managers with asset size W0  W become informed
and the other portfolio managers remain uninformed.
Now the information content is connected to home bias by comparing various demands in
equilibrium. Under the assumption of symmetric countries, the informed portfolio managers
have the same expected demand for domestic assets as the expected demands for foreign assets,
i.e., E ( X AIA ) = E ( X BIA ) and E ( X BIB ) = E ( X AIB ) . There is no home bias. The home bias arises due
to the existence of the uninformed portfolio managers in each country. The expected demand for
the foreign asset by an uninformed portfolio manager is less than his expected demand for the
home asset. The latter is less than the expected demand for risky assets (foreign or domestic) of
IA
IA
informed portfolio managers. That is, E ( X BUA )  E ( X UA
A )  E ( X A ) = E ( X B ) , where the strict

inequality holds if and only if the information cost is positive ( c  0 ).
Intuitively, there are two factors that lead to the above results. First, the uninformed
foreign portfolio managers can only infer partial market information through the asset prices,
which obviously results in a large potential risk hindering their investments. Second, the
uninformed portfolio managers have smaller assets and thus have less risky asset holdings than
informed portfolio managers (see demand function (4) – (5)).
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If we consider the ratio of portfolios in foreign assets for both types of portfolio
managers, the ratio of portfolios in foreign assets of the uninformed portfolio managers is lower
than that of the informed portfolio managers. This leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The informed portfolio managers will have less home bias.
The two hypotheses predict a different degree of home bias across portfolio managers.
Hypothesis 1 presumes that the portfolio managers with a lower information cost ratio (larger
asset under management given the fixed information cost) will be informed. Hypothesis 2
further induces that these informed portfolio managers will have more foreign equity holdings.
Thus we anticipate that portfolio managers with larger investment size will be less home biased.
In summary, the model provides testable hypotheses regarding the extent of home bias
across portfolio managers. Namely, we anticipate that portfolio managers with a relatively low
information cost ratio will be less home biased. This suggests a comparison of the degree of
home bias across portfolio managers relative to their total assets under management.
Corresponding empirical work is done in the next section.

3. Data and Empirical Analysis
This section turns to some empirical tests of the major implications of the model. The
theoretical model implies that informed portfolio managers are less home biased. We test the
hypothesis in the data regression by using the funds allocated to each of the portfolio managers
as a proxy for information asymmetries, controlling many other factors.
3.1. Data and Variable Statistics
The cross-sectional mutual fund equity data are obtained from Morningstar’s Mutual
Funds CD ROM for the year 2005. The dataset contains 12,159 equity funds with 10,131
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domestic equity funds and 2,028 international equity funds. The international equity funds
include Europe, Japan, International Hybrid, Latin America, Diversified Pacific, Pacific
excluding Japan, Specialty Precious Metals, Diversified Emerging Markets, World Stock, and
Foreign Stock.

For the regression analysis, we first focus on the whole sample since the

portfolio manager may diversify through the international equity funds, and then focused on
domestic funds only to consider a more homogeneous fund group.
From the CD, total net assets under management, expense ratios, front load fees, and
back load fees, total number of different holdings of a fund, manager names, manager tenures,
and the composition of the asset as a percentage of total net asset were obtained, which included
the percentage of fund assets in Domestic Equity, Foreign Equity, Bonds, Cash, and Others.
There is another composition reported as percent of funds assets in developed countries and
emerging countries. Table 1 summarizes the above variables.
(Table 1 about here)
As shown in Table 1, the majority of the portfolio is domestic equity (72.57%) and the
average foreign holdings of the equity mutual funds are 19.51%. In an unreported summarized
table for the domestic equity funds only, the average foreign asset holdings are only 6.34%
(86.51% at domestic asset, 4.51% at bonds and 2.64% at cash). This is consistent with Chan et al.
(2005) that mutual funds, in aggregate, allocate a disproportionately larger fraction of investment
to domestic stocks. However, compared with the average American foreign asset holdings of
about ten percent (Lewis, 1999; French and Poterba, 1991; Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Tesar
and Werner, 1995; Ahearne et al., 2004), the US mutual funds, as institutional investors, have
less home bias.
In line with the theoretical model, the assets allocated to each of the portfolio managers
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are used as a proxy of information acquisition. The names of managers who are directly
responsible for managing the fund’s portfolio are taken directly from the fund's prospectus.
Other terms that appear in this column include “Multiple Managers” and “Management Team”.
The “multiple managers” appears when more than two persons are involved in the fund
management and they manage independently. The management team is used when there are
more than two persons involved in fund management and they manage together, or when the
fund strongly promotes its team-managed aspect. In the data, there are 4,485 cases of individual
managers, 5,202 cases of multiple managers and 2,472 cases of management teams. A dummy
variable, GroupDummy, is generated to be 0 if it is an individual manager, 1 if it is a
management team, and 2 if it is multiple managers.
For each manager (or multiple managers or management team), the assets are aggregated
into total Assets by the manager name. Similarly, we created a total number of holdings in
average for manager i as Ttlholdi and total number of funds for manager i as NumFundsi . To
characterize the transaction cost effect on the foreign asset holdings, expense ratio, front load and
back load fees are summed into a total cost and Expi is used to measure the mean expense for
manager i. The variable Tenure measures the years that a manager has been in charge of the
funds, which measures how experience a manager is. In addition, CatDummies is used to control
for different fund categories and fund objectives. Finally, a dummy variable Closeend is set to be
1 if the fund is a closed-end fund, 0 if it is an open-end fund.
Two measurements of concentration are defined based on the stock class allocation and
the regional allocation. The Herfindal Index was adopted to measure the concentration of the
funds (see similar applications at Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng, 2005; Ferreira and Miguel,
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N

2007), which is defined as HI =  wn 2 .
n =1

The first measurement, ( HI1 ), is the regional concentration where wn (n = 1, 2) are the
weights of the total assets allocated to developed markets and emerging markets, respectively.
The second measurement, ( HI 2 ), is a measure of portfolio concentration where wn (n = 1, 2,3, 4)
are the weights of domestic, foreign, bonds and others, respectively. The smaller the Herfindal
Index, the more diversified across regions or across asset categories. The summarized statistics
are listed in Table 1. As can be seen, the percentage of assets in developed countries is more than
97 percent and the corresponding concentration index HI1 is close to 1, which implies that the
assets are more concentrated in developed countries. HI 2 is 0.84, together with the fact that
domestic assets are 73 percent, which implies that the assets are more concentrated in domestic
assets.
3.2. Regression Model and Analysis
Following the above variable definition, the regression model can be written as:

ForeignEquityi = a0 Asseti + a1Expi + a2Ttlholdi + a3Tenurei +
a4 NumFundsi + a5GroupDummyi + a6 HI i + a7CatDummies + a8Closeendi +  i .
The dependent variable, ForeignEquity , is the share of the foreign equity holdings for
manager i . Two measures are used in the regression. First, the percentage of foreign asset for
each manager at each fund is used. Then, the average percentage of foreign assets for each
manager across all the funds under his name is used. Asseti is the log of size of the assets
allocated to manager i , which is the aggregated funds’ Net Asset Value allocated to the same
manager. From the hypothesis, it is expected that a0 will be positive. The variable Expi measures
the average expense for the manager i . The expense could be part of transaction costs or the
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expenses to acquire information. The expected sign will be ambiguous. On one hand, according
to transaction cost explain (see Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994), the higher the transaction cost, the
lower the foreign equity holdings. On the other hand, the higher the information acquisition
expenditure, the higher the foreign equity holdings. Variable Tenurei measures how many years
the fund manager(s) has been in charge of the fund. The longer the tenure, the more experienced
the manager. As Karlsson and Norden (2007) suggests, it is expected that the coefficient will be
positive. For the dummy variable, GroupDummyi , it is expected

that, compared with the

individual managers, the shares of foreign assets for both the management team and multiple
managers are higher.
The model controls other variables that measure the diversification. Ttlholdi is log of the
average number of different holdings of a fund for manager i . This figure is meant to be a
measure of portfolio risk. Specifically, the lower the figure, the more concentrated the fund is in
a few companies or issues, and the more the fund is susceptible to the market fluctuations in
these few holdings. It would be expected that the coefficients would be negative as the more
diversified portfolios across the companies may need less international diversification.
NumFundsi is the log of the average number of funds under managed by fund manager i .

Based on the same reason as Ttlholdi , it is expected that the coefficient for NumFundsi would
be negative. HI i measures the concentration across the asset class -- the smaller the Herfindal
Index, the more diversified across regions or across asset categories. As previously analyzed, the
fact that two measurements of HI i (HI1 and HI2) are close to 1 indicates that the portfolio
managers are concentrated in developed countries (including the US) and in domestic funds.
Therefore, it is expected that the coefficients for them would be negative as they know less about
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foreign assets, implied by Kacperczyk et al. (2005).
Cross-sectional OLS regressions are performed at the manager level. Table 2 estimates
the regression model with the whole sample. All regressions are controlled for the fund category
and objective dummies. The overall fitness for the model is good as the adjusted R-square is
about 90 percent. The dependent variable in the first two columns is the percentage of the foreign
asset holdings for each manager at each fund. The last two columns use the average percentage
of foreign assets for each manager across all the funds under his/her management. For all the
cases, the coefficients for the asset size of the portfolio managers are positive and statistically
significant at a one percent level. The results indicate that the proportion of foreign equity
holdings will increase with the asset size allocated to the portfolio manager. Therefore, the
portfolio will be less home biased when the fund managers manage a larger size of the assets.
This is consistent with the model prediction -- the larger the investment, the less expensive the
information cost per investment. The portfolio managers will acquire more information about
foreign markets and hold more foreign assets.
(Table 2 about here)

The results for the GroupDummyi indicate that the management team significantly holds
more foreign equity shares than the individual, while the multiple managers hold less foreign
equity shares with a significance level of 10% for the first two columns and 5% for the last two
columns. This is consistent with the model discussion that the management team is more likely
to acquire information because the information cost is divided among several managers. We
expected to see larger shares of foreign assets for multiple managers than those of the individual
manager. However, Morningstar defined the multiple managers as “more than two persons are
involved in the fund management, and they manage independently. Where this term is used,

16
quite often the fund has divided net assets in set amounts among the individual managers”. 9
Therefore, multiple managers are seen to hold less foreign equity shares since they divided the
total assets. Interestingly, Baer, Kempf and Ruenzi (2005) find that funds managed by team
exhibit significantly lower risk than single manager funds and more persistent in their
performance over time. This is related to our findings that management teams have more
diversified portfolios.
The estimates of other variables being proxy for information not attributed to sizes
explain part of the foreign equity holdings. The coefficients for the expenses (Exp) are not
significant which indicate the ambiguous effect discussed earlier. That is, the transaction cost
explains that high transaction costs lead to more home bias, while the information cost explains
that the higher expenditure of information acquisition leads to higher foreign equity holdings.
The coefficients of total numbers of different holdings of the funds ( Ttlholdi ) are significantly
and negatively related to the foreign equity holdings. The reason may be that the larger total
number of holdings implies that the assets are more diversified within domestic countries, and
thus there is less need to hold foreign assets. As expected, the coefficients for NumFundsi are
significantly negative, which implies that the more funds a manager is in charge of, the less that
are foreign assets holdings. Both Herfindal Indexes are significantly and negatively associated
with the foreign assets, which are consistent with our expectation. The results for the dummy
Closeend indicate that foreign equity holdings are indifferent between open-end funds and closeended funds. The coefficients for manager Tenure are not consistent with the expectations and
are not significant. This may be due to the fact that the model was tested with the whole sample
and the tenures for management teams are not meaningful. The further subgroup analysis is
conducted as following.
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To test the robustness of size effect on foreign asset holdings, different groups of
managers were further examined. First, the management team is a large group where the
members cannot be identified. Therefore the assets allocated to management teams are large and
may reflect false size effect. Table 3 reports the results for the subgroup sample of single
managers only. As shown in Table 3, the results are similar to Table 2 in that the proportions of
foreign equity holdings are significantly increasing with the size of assets allocated to the
portfolio managers. There is some evidence that management tenure is significantly and
positively related with foreign equity holdings at 5% in column (2).
(Table 3 about here)
Second, some portfolio managers can easily choose to acquire information about a subset
of foreign assets either by focusing on the asset class or by focusing on specific countries.
Therefore, we specifically examined domestic equity funds as a single group in Table 4 and
domestic equity funds with single manager in Table 5. Not surprisingly, the summarized
statistics for the domestic equity funds indicate that the average foreign asset holdings are only
6.34% (86.51% at domestic asset, 4.51 % at bonds and 2.64% at cash). Similarly, the regression
results at both Table 4 and Table 5 show that, controlling all other effects, the foreign equity
shares are significantly increasing with the size of the portfolio.
(Tables 4 and 5 about here)
4. Conclusion
This paper investigates the different degrees of home bias across the portfolio managers.
The theoretical discussion based on Barron and Ni (2006) captures the cause of the informational
differences across the domestic portfolio managers by introducing the information acquisition
process. This distinguishes the paper from the rest of the literature in that it demonstrates a direct
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link between the information cost and home bias. Given the constant information cost, the model
predicts that there exists a proportion of uninformed portfolio managers in the domestic country
because they have relatively high information cost per unit of asset investment. Furthermore, the
model provides testable hypotheses that the portfolio managers with a relatively low information
cost ratio will be less home biased.
The paper finds that mutual fund managers (especially domestic equity fund managers)
reveal home biases, which are consistent with the observations for other groups in previous
literature such as Chan et al. (2005). Most importantly, the regression results show that foreign
asset holdings are positively and significantly associated with the portfolio sizes of the managers,
which is consistent with the theoretical model. This conclusion is robust among the subgroups
(whole sample, single manager group, domestic equity fund group, and domestic equity fund
with single manager) after controlling the other variables such as fund concentration, manager
tenures, total number of holdings, fund categories and objectives, number of funds, expense
ratios, dummies for team management, and dummies for close-ended funds.
In future empirical research, one avenue is to investigate how principle-agent problems
affect the extent of the home bias across institutional investors. As the referee pointed out, the
larger the fund, the less likely the manager is to take risk because it increases the likelihood of
losing his/her position. One conjecture is that the home bias may be aggravated by this
conservative strategy. Correspondingly, the numbers of independent directors affect both future
fund performance and the likelihood of underperforming manager replacement (Ding and
Wermers, 2005), it will be interesting to see how governance structure affects the home bias.
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Footnotes
1

The other previous explanation to the equity home bias includes the hedging theory

(Lewis 1999) that was not supported by empirical evidence (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; Eldor,
Pines and Schwartz, 1988; Stockman and Dellas, 1987; Baxter and Jermann, 1997; Jacquillat and
Solnik, 1978; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994), and international tax and transaction cost barriers
in international capital markets (Black, 1974; Stulz 1981a, 1981b). The empirical tests found that
international taxes and government restrictions can affect the equity home bias among developed
countries (Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal and Wheatley, 1990; Hardouvelis, La Porta and Wizman,
1994; Claessens and Rhee, 1994; Errunza and Losq, 1985), but not for less developed countries
(Lewis 1995, 1999). Tesar and Werner (1995) argue that transaction cost cannot explain the
home bias based on the high turnover rate of foreign assets. However, recent works reinforce the
role of transaction cost on home bias and it can coexist with the high turnover rate (Rowland,
1999; Amadi and Bergin, 2006).
2

Some related studies find that home bias phenomena exist not only internationally but

also regionally (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001).
3

Their further examinations indicate that more can be explained by behavioral

determinants. Also see Strong and Xu (2003) for a behavioral explanation.
4

Karlsson and Norden (2007) find that in Sweden the likelihood of home bias increases

on smaller wealth, higher ages and less experienced persons. Graham et al. (2005) find that the
share of home investments for a sample of US investors is positively related to lower income,
higher age, less education, and being female.
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5

The most popular alternative was future compensation based on piecewise linear (and

concave) functions of the future value of the managed assets. Bagnoli and Watts (2000) noted
that these compensation forms reflect Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations
for fund manager compensation, and in particular, the Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970, amended section 205.
6

In the rational expectation model setting, a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA)

utility function for the portfolio manager allows for an explicit demand function solution.
Assuming the special inverse function of initial portfolio size simplifies calculations for the
market clear condition.
7

This follows as managers of a fund have identical preferences and compensation

package, and thus will agree on the optimal portfolio that maximizes the expected utility derived
from compensation.
8

The proof is available upon request.

9

2004 Morningstar, Inc.
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Table 1: Summarized Statistics
Variable
Asset Allocation
as % of domestic assets
as % of foreign assets
as % of bonds
as % of other
Total
as % of Assets at developed Countries
as % of Assets at emerging Countries
Total
Size (Unit: Million dollars)
Expense Ratio
Front Load Fee
Deferred Load Fee
Average Total Number of Holdings
Manage Tenure
Average Number of Funds
HI1
HI2

Obs
11761
11761
11761
11761
11761
11579
11579
11761
12159
10967
12159
12159
11811
9745
12159
11579
11761

Mean

Std. Dev.

72.57
35.48
19.51
32.12
5.04
14.12
2.89
11.80
100.0
97.43
9.36
2.54
9.32
100.0
79,527.06 150,559.50
1.54
0.71
1.07
2.13
0.92
1.72
169.54
299.54
4.68
3.88
433.51
878.90
0.97
0.08
0.83
0.19

Min

Max

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

100.00
100.00
98.94
100.00

0.00
0.00

100.00
100.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
0.50
0.28

383,977.20
10.00
8.50
6.00
6211.00
46.50
2268.00
1.00
1.00
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Table 2: Effect of Portfolio Size on Foreign Equity Holdings (Whole Sample)
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets)
Asset Size
Expense
Log of Total Number of Holdings
Manager Tenure
Number of Funds
Dummy for Team Management (=1)
Dummy for Multiple Managers (=2)
Dummy for Close-ended Funds (=1)
HI1

(1)
0.431
(0.053)***
-0.016
(0.096)
-0.957
(0.098)***
0.001
(0.023)
-0.053
(0.009)***
9.724
(2.206)***
-0.313
(0.181)*
-0.312
(0.412)
-50.977
(1.684)***

HI2
Constant

56.578
(1.813)***
8688
0.94

(2)
(3)
0.329
0.456
(0.056)*** (0.065)***
0.113
0.065
(0.101)
(0.067)
-0.795
-0.858
(0.100)*** (0.123)***
0.019
-0.029
(0.024)
(0.029)
-0.041
-0.069
(0.009)*** (0.010)***
9.685
11.722
(2.316)*** (2.682)***
-0.311
-0.544
(0.189)*
(0.222)**
-0.306
-0.256
(0.430)
(0.508)
-46.825
(2.055)***
-23.067
(0.796)***
26.584
51.975
(1.054)*** (2.231)***
8813
9187
0.93
0.89

(4)
0.372
(0.067)***
0.118
(0.068)*
-0.789
(0.123)***
-0.013
(0.029)
-0.059
(0.011)***
12.134
(2.750)***
-0.512
(0.226)**
-0.334
(0.519)

-21.107
(0.950)***
24.444
(1.306)***
9312
0.89

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for
space efficiency.
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Table 3: Effect of Portfolio Size on Foreign Equity Holdings (Single Manager Group)
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets)
Asset Size
Expense
Log of Total Number of Holdings
Manager Tenure
Number of Funds
Dummy for Close-ended Funds
(=1)
HI1

(1)
0.439
(0.076)***
-0.203
(0.135)
-1.442
(0.147)***
0.004
(0.030)
-0.062
(0.010)***
0.484
(0.634)
-48.313
(2.272)***

HI2
Constant

56.667
(2.430)***
3968
0.94

(2)
0.377
(0.085)***
0.157
(0.150)
-0.861
(0.161)***
0.068
(0.034)**
-0.051
(0.011)***
0.590
(0.711)

-23.576
(1.185)***
27.433
(1.554)***
4044
0.92

(3)
0.470
(0.103)***
0.075
(0.108)
-1.039
(0.205)***
-0.031
(0.042)
-0.071
(0.013)***
0.541
(0.870)
-47.660
(3.076)***

53.293
(3.329)***
4209
0.87

(4)
0.426
(0.108)***
0.313
(0.113)***
-0.605
(0.211)***
0.032
(0.044)
-0.063
(0.014)***
0.780
(0.914)

-21.707
(1.502)***
23.046
(2.049)***
4285
0.85

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for
space efficiency.
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Table 4: Effect of Portfolio Size on Foreign Equity Holdings (Domestic Manager Group)
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
Asset Size
0.545
0.121
0.557
0.176
(0.043)*** (0.034)*** (0.041)***
(0.033)***
Expense
-0.027
-0.013
-0.026
-0.020
(0.078)
(0.060)
(0.042)
(0.034)
Log of Total Number of Holdings
-0.736
-0.317
-0.718
-0.409
(0.080)*** (0.060)*** (0.078)***
(0.061)***
Manager Tenure
0.002
0.034
-0.003
0.032
(0.019)
(0.015)**
(0.018)
(0.014)**
Number of Funds
-0.048
-0.016
-0.049
-0.021
(0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)***
(0.005)***
Dummy for Team Management (=1)
7.759
7.242
4.066
3.793
(1.853)*** (1.438)*** (1.762)**
(1.418)***
Dummy for Multiple Managers (=2)
0.026
-0.457
-0.233
-0.499
(0.149)
(0.115)*** (0.142)
(0.114)***
Dummy for Close-ended Funds (=1)
-0.103
-0.381
0.218
-0.242
(0.334)
(0.258)
(0.319)
(0.256)
HI1
-124.530
-110.285
(2.376)***
(2.278)***
HI2
-48.251
-43.455
(0.492)***
(0.484)***
Constant
127.507
49.149
113.307
44.730
(2.390)*** (0.628)*** (2.294)***
(0.640)***
Observations
7147
7260
7598
7711
Adjusted R-squared
0.46
0.67
0.42
0.62
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for
space efficiency.
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Table 5: Effect of Portfolio Size on Foreign Equity Holdings (Domestic Single Manager
Group)
(Dependent Variable: Percentage of Foreign Assets)
Asset Size
Expense
Log of Total Number of Holdings
Manager Tenure
Number of Funds
Dummy for Close-ended Funds
(=1)
HI1

(1)
0.492
(0.064)***
-0.096
(0.115)
-1.338
(0.125)***
-0.002
(0.026)
-0.050
(0.008)***
0.484
(0.541)
-114.880
(3.004)***

HI2
Constant

120.912
(3.031)***
3329
0.51

(2)
0.092
(0.051)*
0.027
(0.089)
-0.354
(0.096)***
0.106
(0.021)***
-0.022
(0.007)***
-0.437
(0.424)

-50.037
(0.735)***
50.600
(0.915)***
3393
0.69

(3)
0.492
(0.061)***
-0.099
(0.066)
-1.325
(0.122)***
-0.017
(0.025)
-0.044
(0.008)***
0.636
(0.520)
-99.522
(2.918)***

(4)
0.145
(0.050)***
0.027
(0.054)
-0.527
(0.098)***
0.087
(0.021)***
-0.020
(0.006)***
-0.026
(0.424)

-43.838
(0.723)***
105.890
45.249
(2.952)*** (0.938)***
3543
3607
0.45
0.63

Observations
Adjusted R-squared
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: Fund category and objective dummies are included in the regression but not reported for
space efficiency.

